Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Public debt accumulation is a social problem in some developed countries. After the financial shocks in 2008, the pace of public debt accumulation has accelerated. It is predicted that the general government gross financial liabilities (public debt stock) per Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of OECD countries in all will be almost 100% in 2012. Particularly, the accumulation of public debt stock in Japan will be more than 200% of GDP in 2012.
[Insert Fig. 1 
around here.]
Some people might be anxious that their country, which owes so much debt, would declare bankruptcy.
To avoid sovereign bankruptcy, some countries must carry out fiscal reforms. Two basic ways exist to decrease the public debt stock per GDP: raising the tax burden and increasing population. Even if the tax burden per capita remains constant, population growth can bring higher tax revenues. Population growth contributes to economic growth, which increases tax revenues. Therefore, population growth might be more effective to decrease the public debt stock per GDP than an increased tax burden.
Child allowances are commonly regarded as instruments used by governments for policies of family support. Some earlier papers examined the effects of child allowances in the economy with endogenous fertility. Zhang (1997) , Oshio (2001) , van Groezen et al. (2003) , and van Groezen and Meijdam (2008) reported that the fertility level is raised by child allowances in the economy with a pay-as-you-go pension system.
1
Some earlier research papers have described public debt. Diamond (1965) considered public debt in an overlapping-generations model. Samuelson (1958) and Azariadis (1993) examined whether a fiscal policy that brings about fiscal deficit is sustainable or not in terms of fiscal management. Sustainability depends on the primary fiscal deficit and on the gap separating interest rates and the population growth rate. Government expenditures in these models are regarded as public consumption. Similarly, Chalk (2000) and Bräuninger (2005) investigated whether public bond financing is sustainable or not in a model incorporating government consumption. Ono (2003) examined the dynamics of public debt stock and capital stock and found that they depend on parametric conditions and the initial level of public debt 1 However, child allowances can not always raise fertility. Fanti and Gori (2009) found that taxation for children raises fertility because of the income effect in a closed economy. In other words, they showed that a child allowance lowers fertility because of decreased capital per capita, i.e. income.
stock. In the paper, the government issues public debt to finance the wedge between contributions for public pension and benefits of that in a closed economy with a fixed contribution rate and benefits. Meijdam et al. (1996) examined the dynamics of public debt stock in a small open economy and derived the manner in which taxation affects the dynamics of public debt. Yakita (2008) investigated public capital formation financed by public debt and examined the sustainability of fiscal management.
Our paper presents development of a model with endogenous fertility and analyzes whether child allowances financed by public debt can reduce public debt stock per GDP or not in the long run. Child allowances raise fertility and then bring about a population effect that decreases public debt stock per GDP because an increase in the population of younger people raises income tax revenues. In Japan, total fertility was about 1.4 at 2010, which is a low level in OECD countries.
2 The Japanese government is seeking to raise fertility through provision of child allowances to sustain an aging society. Our analyses derive that child allowances financed by public debt increase the public debt stock per GDP in the long run if the government targets zero public debt stock in the long run. Indeed, child allowances financed by public debt can raise fertility, and there exists a population effect to decrease public debt stock per GDP through an increase in tax revenue. However, increased public debt prevents capital accumulation, and GDP decreases as a result. In short, because this effect is greater than the population effect, child allowances financed by public debt can not decrease the public debt stock per GDP. Even if the government targets positive public debt stock per GDP in the long run, child allowances can not decrease public debt stock per GDP. Therefore, given a non-negative public debt stock policy, a population effect by which revenue rises because of an increase in younger people is small. It is insufficient to reduce the public debt stock per GDP.
The remainder of this paper presents the following. Section 2 of this paper establishes the model. Section 3 derives equilibrium in a closed economy. Section 4 examines the effect of child allowances on the public debt stock per GDP. The final section presents results.
The Model
This model economy consists of a two-period (young and old) overlapping generations model. Three agents exist in this model: households, firms, and a government. In the following subsection, we explain each agent.
Households
Each household lives in three periods-childhood, young, and old-and supplies labor to earn an income during the young period. Young people supply labor inelastically for consumption during the young period and use savings to consume during the old period in addition to caring for children. A government provides not only a pension system that gives older people a fixed benefit, but also a child allowance for younger people. The budget constraint is given as
Therein, q t denotes the child allowance. Furthermore, n t represents the number of children. Necessary goods to bring up a child are represented as z t . In addition, c 1t and c 2t+1 respectively denote consumption during young and old periods. Here, w t shows the wage rate. Interest rate 1 + r t+1 is returned to savings.
Younger people face income taxation (tax rate or contribution rate τ ). Older people receive a pension benefit p t+1 . Furthermore, t signifies the period. We assume that the child-care cost z t depends on wage income such as z t =ẑw t (ẑ > 0). 3 Moreover, the government provides a child allowance as q t =qw t (ẑ >q > 0) and pension benefit as p t+1 =xw t (x > 0). 4 A household's utility function is assumed as
Under the budget constraint (1), the allocation of c 1t , c 2t+1 , and n t to maximize their utility is shown
Firms
A representative firm produces final good Y t with constant returns to scale or a neoclassical product function, shown as
The firm inputs capital stock K t and labor (population size of younger people) N t . The productivity A t is given as a Romer-type externality, as described by Romer (1986) and Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) .
θ and a are given exogenously. With a perfectly competitive market, the wage rate w t and the interest rate r t are
1
where
, and where capital stock depreciates fully in a single period. An interest rate is constant over time. Fertility n t is constant (n t = n), too.
Government
The government executes two policies: one for the pension and one for child allowances. A payroll tax rate τ , which we can regard as the contribution rate, is levied on younger people. Older people receive pension benefit p t . Assuming a balanced budget in each period, the government must change the tax rate to balance the budget. However, allowing a fiscal deficit, the government need not change the tax rate in each period. Therefore, the government budget is shown as 
Equilibrium
Having examined the agents' behavior, we proceed to analysis of the equilibrium. 
Consequently, we obtain the following equation.
An increase in b t+1 prevents capital accumulation such that income per capita y t and wage rate w t decrease. This is a crowding-out effect. Then, the equilibrium is determined by the following two equations,
H corresponds to out capital accumulation. Because H > 0 and because of the non-negative k t+1 , J > 0 must be assumed.
and considering (11) and (12), we obtain
Because of k t = yt a 1−θ and v t = a
, we consider v t as the public debt stock/GDP ratio. We consider the equilibrium without child allowancesq = 0. Additionally, we consider the economy with I = 0, which is the primary balanced fiscal policy. 7 Then, we obtain ∂vt+1 ∂vt > 0 and 
Policy Effects
First, we examine the effect of an increase in child allowancesq on v * = 0 the public debt stock per GDP in the steady state. Calculating
at an approximation ofq = 0 for any v t , we obtain
As shown in Fig. 3 , an increase inq increases v * .
[Insert Fig. 3 around here.]
Then, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 1 If the public debt stock per GDP is zero in a stable steady state, then an increase in child allowances raises the public debt stock per GDP in a stable steady state.
7 the pension benefitx must be held byx =
to obtain I = 0.
8 The condition to be J > H is
An increase in child allowances financed by public debt raises the fertility given by (5). Then, population growth increases. The share of older people to total population shrinks. Tax revenues are growing for pension benefits for older people. Therefore, we can infer that child allowances financed by public debt reduce the public debt stock per GDP in the long run because of an increase in tax revenue given by an increase in younger population. However, this effect is weak and is dominated by a direct increase in public debt.
Second, we examine the effect of child allowances on public debt stock per GDP in the economy with I > 0. If I > 0, then v * is given as a positive value. The government in each country targets some positive public debt per GDP such as the budget rule in the European Union (EU). In the EU, each country must obey the budget rule that public debt stock per GDP be less than 60% and that the annual fiscal deficit be less than 3%. Therefore, in addition to the policy that the government targets no public debt stock in the long run, it is important to examine the fiscal budget rule v * > 0 as a realistic target.
Calculating dv * dq at an approximation ofq = 0 in I > 0, we obtain the following
Proposition 2
We assume an economy with positive v * in a steady state. An increase in child allowances raises public debt stock per GDP.
Regarding non-negative public debt stock per GDP, an increase in child allowances raises the public debt stock per GDP in the steady state v * . As shown by I, the first term in I includesq. With I > 0, this first term is positive unless child allowances are not provided. This positive term shows that payments for older people as pension benefits are greater than tax revenue. An increase inq shrinks this term.
This effect reduces b t+1 , i.e., v * . An increase inq increases fertility. An increase in population growth raises tax revenues from younger people, compared with pension benefits for older people. However, in the endogenous growth model given by production function (6), the population effect that reduces public debt stock is small.
9 the stable condition holds 1 −
H(J+I)
(−Hv * +J) 2 > 0.
Concluding Remarks
This paper describes an endogenous fertility model with a pay-as-you-go pension model including public debt. It examines the effect of child allowances. Child allowances are used to raise fertility. A government in a developed country considers that an increase in fertility brings about an increase in tax revenue in the future because of an increase in younger people. This policy therefore copes with an aging society.
This paper presents analysis of whether child allowances financed by public debt can decrease public debt stock per GDP thanks to an increase in younger people or not. However, this paper presents a derivation that child allowances financed by public debt raise the public debt stock per GDP in the model with no public debt policy in the long run. Even if the government adopts a positive public debt stock policy in the long run, child allowances can not reduce the public debt stock per GDP. Therefore, an increase in the younger population given by child allowances does not make sense for reduction of the public debt stock per GDP. Child allowances increase the public debt stock directly. This constitutes a direct and immediate effect. However, child allowances raise fertility. Therefore, the ratio of younger people to older people increases. Consequently, tax revenue increases for pension benefit for older people and child allowances have the effect of decreasing the public debt stock. This is an indirect effect. Our paper verifies that the indirect effect is less than the direct effect. For that reason, child allowances can not reduce public debt stock per GDP. 
